When a teacher asks a student who cheated to redo an assignment, how is it that the teacher sometimes has to spend more energy justifying the request to the adults than working with the student? In a video that has passed 300,000 views on YouTube (in French), I described a situation in which neither the parents nor the institution supported the teacher’s request. The video drew more than a thousand comments, many of which echo what I myself observed when I was a teacher.
So why do we find it so hard to play our part as adults, and what exactly does that part demand of us?
What responsibility do we have towards those who arrive?
In “The Crisis in Education”, an essay from her collection Between Past and Future, Hannah Arendt starts from the observation that a child arrives in a world that was there before them, where they find a language they did not invent, works, knowledge and institutions whose history and workings they do not yet know. It falls to the adult to present this world to the child and to answer for it before them, even when the adult disapproves of part of what they have received. As they grow up, the child will in turn be able to transform this world in ways we never imagined, and education would fail in its task if, after giving them access to this world, we dictated what they should do with it.
This double responsibility is uncomfortable. We would sometimes like to present ourselves as those who already know where to go. At other times, discouraged by what we see of the world or of ourselves, we are tempted to withdraw and leave it to the young to find their own way. But playing one’s part as an adult means neither holding the answers nor abandoning one’s place. It means, rather, taking responsibility for holding a common space in which certain values are passed on and certain questions can be worked on, even when no one yet knows how to answer them.
Refusing cheating, requiring students to think for themselves
Cheating has its own logic: if only the result counts, one right answer is as good as another, whoever found it. Yet a wrong answer can open up a whole discussion in which the teacher looks with the student at how they went about it and at what point they went wrong, perhaps even discovering that the instructions lent themselves to several interpretations. It also happens that, in explaining their mistake, the student raises a question the teacher had never asked. A copied right answer would have offered them none of these opportunities.
By asking the student to genuinely do the work and hand in a new copy, the teacher invites them to put forward an answer without being sure it is right, and then to look at what it is worth. The adults around this student, whether their parents, their head teacher or other members of the school staff, may well understand the point of this demand. What, then, leads them to let the teacher carry it alone, or even to ask the teacher to give it up?
What disagreement costs us
The first explanation lies in the fairly ordinary wish to spare ourselves trouble. Backing the teacher’s demand may mean, for a head teacher, meeting a family and defending before them a decision it would be so easy to drop; for a colleague, getting involved in a dispute they could stay out of; for a parent, spending the evening with a child who resents them. As soon as everyone leaves it to someone else to face the disagreement, the teacher is left alone to defend a demand whose meaning everyone could nonetheless recognise.
A child’s resentment can also make us doubt ourselves. As a mother, I may have solid reasons for asking my child to make this effort and still find it very hard to bear that he thinks me harsh or unfair. If I expect him to reassure me about my worth as a mother, I hand him a strange power: that of judging how I raise him at the very moment he is feeling its frustration. The difficulty also arises the other way round, when a teacher tells me my child has cheated and I immediately hear in it a judgement on the way I brought him up. There I am, busy defending my image of myself, when my child would need us to look with him at what led him to copy and at what this cheating prevented him from working on. We could try to understand what he did without justifying it, and without giving up on asking him to redo his assignment.
To this personal anxiety, it seems to me, is added a more collective dismay, closely tied to our times. When we think of the world we are leaving to the next generations, what comes to mind is the ecological damage of our ways of life, the place we have given to consumption, the gap between the values we profess and what we are willing to do for them. This harsh judgement can feed a kind of disaffection with ourselves that finds an attractive refuge in youth: where we have failed, the young would know how to go about it. But when we expect the young to repair our failures, part of their future is already taken up by the accounts we have to settle with ourselves.
Admiring the young or despising them
High school students march for the climate or against Parcoursup, the French university admissions platform, and some adults rejoice that “the young are waking up”. One can admire the courage it takes to speak out in public, and have things to learn from what these young people came to say. If students find Parcoursup unfair, what, in their view, produces this unfairness? The selection procedure, the inequalities between applicants when they draw up their choices, the shortage of places on certain courses? Depending on their answer, the discussion changes, and it becomes possible to agree with them on one point, to raise an objection on another, or to revise one’s own judgement in the light of what they have experienced. But we must also accept that they question us in turn. When students ask us what we intend to do about the ecological consequences of our choices, we may be tempted to reply that their commitment gives us hope again. This admiration, however sincere, can excuse us from listening to them: we celebrate what they represent for us instead of answering what they are asking us. By presenting them as the ones who will change the world, we even hand back to them the responsibility they are inviting us to take. They question us about our actions; we answer by praising their commitment.
Other adults look at the same students and shrug, convinced that at that age one repeats what one has heard and that a demonstration is mostly an opportunity to skip class. Admiration can even turn into contempt as soon as a young person defends a position that displeases. Will the adult who hails the protesters’ independence of mind recognise it just as readily in their classmate who speaks up in favour of going back to class?
Starry-eyed admiration and contempt are here two sides of the same judgement, since some see in the protesters’ youth a guarantee of clear-sightedness while others draw from their age a reason to disqualify them before even hearing them out. A student who would like to explain how they reached their conclusion may thus find as little attention from the one who applauds them as from the one who mocks them.
The child philosopher, a refuge for adults
This temptation to seek refuge in youth also strikes me in a certain conception of philosophy for children that turns the adult’s wonder into a kind of teaching principle. A child need only ask an unexpected question for us to celebrate in them the philosopher that adult life is supposed to have stifled in us. The child speaks, the adult is enraptured, collects the phrase and reports it to other adults who will marvel in their turn. We claim to put the child’s thinking at the centre, when the child may have vanished from the conversation as soon as they gave us the word we wanted to hear.
A child asks me: “Where was I before I was born?” I can admire their metaphysical daring without even having checked what they are trying to understand, for “before I was born” may mean to them the time when they were in their mother’s womb, just as well as a time when they did not yet exist. So I can ask: “When you say ‘before I was born’, do you mean the time when you were in your mother’s tummy, or a time when she wasn’t expecting you yet?” Let us imagine they specify: “I mean before I was in her tummy. Was I already somewhere?” We can then examine what they assume in asking their question: “When you ask where you were, do you think you already existed?” If they answer that they were nowhere, I would like to know what they mean by that: “For you, are being nowhere and not existing yet the same thing?” They may also stop me at my very first question and explain that I have misunderstood them, which my admiration would have deprived me of had I hastened to conclude that children are natural philosophers.
What a philosophy workshop can bring to education
What interests me in philosophical practice with children is the relationship to knowledge that can be exercised there, and which was already at stake in the story of the copied assignment. For that, we have to go beyond the wonder their words may arouse. As soon as an adult asks a child how they arrived at an idea, what they mean by a word or what they would say to an objection, the adult passes on a way of working on what one thinks, including when the question concerns a rule the adult has imposed on them.
Take a common situation: a child pushes another, and the teacher asks him to apologise. It is up to this adult to stop the jostling and to look after the child who was pushed, but nothing prevents her, once the incident is over, from putting to the children the question her own decision raises: “Can you force someone to apologise?”
Let us imagine one child answers: “Yes, when I pushed someone, the teacher made me say sorry.” Another may object: “She made you say it, but were you sorry you pushed him?” If at that moment I explain to them what, in my view, a sincere apology is, I risk losing an answer I had not foreseen, for the first could very well reply to his classmate: “Even if I wasn’t sorry, I still owed him an apology.” The one who held sincerity to be decisive must then go back over his own judgement to make room in it for the point of view of the child who was pushed. What do we owe him, even when we still think we were right?
It is in this way of holding a question that I place my practice in the line of Socrates. This dialogue may come to an end without the children agreeing on the value of forced apologies, but each will have had to respond to a difficulty raised by another, so that their very disagreement will have become something they were able to think through together.
I find here, on the scale of a classroom, the double responsibility Arendt speaks of. By asking for an apology, the teacher introduces the children into a world where someone we have hurt can expect a gesture of reparation from us. By then giving them the opportunity to question this gesture, she accepts that what she passes on to them becomes in turn the object of their judgement. For that, she must care enough about this rule to be able to answer for it before them, and make enough room for them to hear what they will have to say about it, right down to the objection she had not foreseen.
PhilomobileBy Laurence Bouchet
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These lines make no claim to definitive truth: they are a proposal to discuss, extend or contradict. Your objections, questions and hypotheses are welcome.